Ordo Amoris, A Jewish Perspective

By Dr Donald Franklin, for the Jewish Ethics project

Last January, the incoming United States Vice President JD Vance sparked some controversy by invoking the doctrine of ordo amoris to justify giving priority to family and fellow citizens over foreigners: “[Y]ou love your family, and then you love your neighbor, and then you love your community, and then you love your fellow citizens in your own country, and then after that you can focus and prioritize the rest of the world.” The late Pope, Francis, apparently taking issue with Mr. Vance, wrote in February that “the true ordo amoris that must be promoted is that which we discover by meditating constantly on the parable of the ‘Good Samaritan’ … that is, by meditating on the love that builds a fraternity open to all, without exception.”  Pope Francis, Vance Clash Over ‘Ordo Amoris’| National Catholic Register

What has Judaism to say?  Vice President Vance’s order of love brings to mind the order of priority given in the Talmud in considering who should have priority to receive a charitable loan:

דְּתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״אִם כֶּסֶף תַּלְוֶה אֶת עַמִּי אֶת הֶעָנִי עִמָּךְ״. עַמִּי וְגוֹי – עַמִּי קוֹדֵם, עָנִי וְעָשִׁיר – עָנִי קוֹדֵם. ״עֲנִיֶּיךָ וַעֲנִיֵּי עִירֶךָ״ – עֲנִיֶּיךָ קוֹדְמִין, עֲנִיֵּי עִירֶךָ וַעֲנִיֵּי עִיר אַחֶרֶת – עֲנִיֵּי עִירֶךָ קוֹדְמִין

תלמוד בבלי, מסכת בבא מציעא, דף ע"א, עמוד א

… that which Rav Yosef taught: The verse states: “If you lend money to any of My people, even to the poor person who is with you” (Exodus 22:24). The term “My people” teaches that if one of My people, i.e., a Jew, and a gentile both come to borrow money from you, My people take precedence. The term “the poor person” teaches that if a poor person and a rich person come to borrow money, the poor person takes precedence. And from the term: “Who is with you,” it is derived: If your poor person, meaning one of your relatives, and one of the poor of your city come to borrow money, your poor person takes precedence. If it is between one of the poor of your city and one of the poor of another city, the one of the poor of your city takes precedence.

Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 71a

And these rules echo many others that apparently enjoin Jews to favour their fellow Jews over others: taking interest, treatment of servants etc etc.

The ethical justification for thus differentiating between obligations to members of one’s own community and those of others should not be understood as disparaging the humanity of others. Rather it is emphasising the value for the relationships upon which community is built. The philosopher Bernard Williams famously suggested that no calculation was required to justify a man saving his wife rather than a stranger from a fire; a calculation “provides the agent with one thought too many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance by his wife) that his motivating thought fully spelt out, would be the thought that it was his wife …” (“Persons, Character and Morality” in Williams 1981). Prioritisation flows from the nature of the relationship, and the same might be true for the relationships underpinning a strong sense of community, as the Rambam suggests in the following passage paralleling obligations to community with those to close family kin:

וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהַנִּלְוֶה עֲלֵיהֶם כְּאַחִים הֵם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יד א) "בָּנִים אַתֶּם לַה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם" וְאִם לֹא יְרַחֵם הָאָח עַל הָאָח מִי יְרַחֵם עָלָיו. וּלְמִי עֲנִיֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל נוֹשְׂאִין עֵינֵיהֶן. הֲלְעַכּוּ"ם שֶׁשּׂוֹנְאִין אוֹתָן וְרוֹדְפִים אַחֲרֵיהֶן. הָא אֵין עֵינֵיהֶן תְּלוּיוֹת אֶלָּא לַאֲחֵיהֶן
משנה תורה הִלְכוֹת מַתְּנוֹת עֲנִיִּים י:ב

The entire Jewish people and all those who attach themselves to them are as brothers, as [Deuteronomy 14:1] states: "You are children unto God your Lord." And if a brother will not show mercy to a brother, who will show mercy to them? To whom do the poor of Israel lift up their eyes? To the gentiles who hate them and pursue them? Behold their eyes are pointed to their brethren alone.

Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Gifts to the Poor 10.2

***

Nevertheless, there are other perspectives within Judaism.

THE QUALITY OF MERCY IS NOT STRAINED.

First, whilst obligations to deal kindly with fellow members of one’s own community are thus independently motivated by the good of community, compassion towards all fellow creatures is also enjoined. Unlike charity to kin, compassionate treatment of others is not judicable, but neither is it supererogatory. That it is demanded of us is evident in the Rambam’s blandishments at the end of the section on non-Jewish servants detailing the legal rights of a master to treat his non-Jewish servant harshly… (I translate עבד as servant as a more respectful term, and one consistent with the standard translation of Moses’ appellation as עבד נאמן). Note in particular the invocation of Job’s powerful insistence on our common humanity.

מֻתָּר לַעֲבֹד בְּעֶבֶד כְּנַעֲנִי בְּפָרֶךְ. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַדִּין כָּךְ מִדַּת חֲסִידוּת וְדַרְכֵי חָכְמָה שֶׁיִּהְיֶה אָדָם רַחְמָן וְרוֹדֵף צֶדֶק וְלֹא יַכְבִּיד עֵלּוֹ עַל עַבְדּוֹ וְלֹא יָצֵר לוֹ וְיַאֲכִילֵהוּ וְיַשְׁקֵהוּ מִכָּל מַאֲכָל וּמִכָּל מִשְׁתֶּה. חֲכָמִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים הָיוּ נוֹתְנִין לָעֶבֶד מִכָּל תַּבְשִׁיל וְתַבְשִׁיל שֶׁהָיוּ אוֹכְלִין. וּמַקְדִּימִין מְזוֹן הַבְּהֵמוֹת וְהָעֲבָדִים לִסְעוּדַת עַצְמָן. הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר (תהילים קכג ב) "כְעֵינֵי עֲבָדִים אֶל יַד אֲדוֹנֵיהֶם כְּעֵינֵי שִׁפְחָה אֶל יַד גְּבִרְתָּהּ". וְכֵן לֹא יְבַזֵּהוּ בַּיָּד וְלֹא בִּדְבָרִים. לְעַבְדוּת מְסָרָן הַכָּתוּב לֹא לְבוּשָׁה. וְלֹא יַרְבֶּה עָלָיו צְעָקָה וְכַעַס אֶלָּא יְדַבֵּר עִמּוֹ בְּנַחַת וְיִשְׁמַע טַעֲנוֹתָיו. וְכֵן מְפֹרָשׁ בְּדַרְכֵי אִיּוֹב הַטּוֹבִים שֶׁהִשְׁתַּבֵּחַ בָּהֶן (איוב לא יג) "אִם אֶמְאַס מִשְׁפַּט עַבְדִּי וַאֲמָתִי בְּרִבָם עִמָּדִי" (איוב לא טו) "הֲלֹא בַבֶּטֶן עשֵֹׁנִי עָשָׂהוּ וַיְכֻנֶנּוּ בָּרֶחֶם אֶחָד". וְאֵין הָאַכְזָרִיּוּת וְהָעַזּוּת מְצוּיָה אֶלָּא בְּעַכּוּ"ם עוֹבְדֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֲבָל זַרְעוֹ שֶׁל אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ וְהֵם יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהִשְׁפִּיעַ לָהֶם הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא טוֹבַת הַתּוֹרָה וְצִוָּה אוֹתָם בְּחֻקִּים וּמִשְׁפָּטִים צַדִּיקִים רַחְמָנִים הֵם עַל הַכּל. וְכֵן בְּמִדּוֹתָיו שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא שֶּׁצִּוָּנוּ לְהִדָּמוֹת בָּהֶם הוּא אוֹמֵר (תהילים קמה ט) "וְרַחֲמָיו עַל כָּל מַעֲשָׂיו". וְכָל הַמְרַחֵם מְרַחֲמִין עָלָיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים יג יח) "וְנָתַן לְךָ רַחֲמִים וְרִחַמְךָ וְהִרְבֶּךָ"

משנה תורה, הלכות עבדים ט:ח

It is permissible to have a Canaanite servant perform excruciating labour. Although this is the law, the attribute of piety and the way of wisdom is for a person to be merciful and to pursue justice, not to make his servants carry a heavy yoke, nor cause them distress. He should allow them to partake of all the food and drink he serves. […] Similarly, we should not embarrass a servant by our deeds or with words, for the Torah prescribed that they perform service, not that they be humiliated. Nor should one shout or vent anger upon them extensively. Instead, one should speak to them gently, and listen to their claims. This is explicitly stated with regard to the positive paths of Job for which he was praised Job 31:13, 15: "Have I ever shunned justice for my servant and maid-servant when they quarrelled with me.... Did not He who made me in the belly make him? Was it not the One who prepared us in the womb?"
[…] And similarly, with regard to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, which He commanded us to emulate, it is written Psalms 145:9: "His mercies are upon all of His works." And whoever shows mercy to others will have mercy shown to him, as implied by Deuteronomy 13:18: "He will show you mercy, and be merciful upon you and multiply you."

Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Servants, 9:8

THE SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS OF COMMUNITY INCLUDES NON-JEWISH NEIGHBOURS.

Second, whilst partiality is thus justified to embody community, the relevant concept of community is widened by considerations of peaceful coexistence to include non-Jewish neighbours:

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מְפַרְנְסִים עֲנִיֵּי גוֹיִם עִם עֲנִיֵּי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וּמְבַקְּרִין חוֹלֵי גוֹיִם עִם חוֹלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְקוֹבְרִין מֵתֵי גוֹיִם עִם מֵתֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, מִפְּנֵי דַּרְכֵי שָׁלוֹם

גיטין סא

The rabbis taught: “Provide for the poor of the gentiles with the poor of Israel, and visit the sick of the gentiles with the sick of Israel, and bury the dead of the Gentiles with the dead of Israel; for these are the paths of peace.

Babylonian Talmud Gittin 61a

This is cited verbatim for Halacha by the Rambam (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Gifts to the Poor 7.7) and he accordingly modifies the order of priority for giving alms to the poor from that given above (when prioritising lending), here prioritising family and geographical community only:

עָנִי שֶׁהוּא קְרוֹבוֹ קֹדֶם לְכָל אָדָם. עֲנִיֵּי בֵּיתוֹ קוֹדְמִין לַעֲנִיֵּי עִירוֹ. עֲנִיֵּי עִירוֹ קוֹדְמִין לַעֲנִיֵּי עִיר אַחֶרֶת. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים טו יא) "לְאָחִיךָ לַעֲנִיֶּךָ וּלְאֶבְיֹנְךָ בְּאַרְצֶךָ"

 משנה תורה הִלְכוֹת מַתְּנוֹת עֲנִיִּים ז:י"ג

A poor person who is one's relative receives priority over all others. The poor of one's household receive priority over the poor of one's city. And the poor of one's city receive priority over the poor of another city, as [implied by Deuteronomy 15:11]: "[You shall surely open your hand to] your brother, the poor, and the destitute in your land."

Maimonides Mishneh Torah, Gifts to the Poor 7.13

The concept of community shows itself to be nuanced: there is a specific and deep bond to be fostered amongst members of the same kehilla and amongst co-religionists more generally; but the community within which the ways of peace, the ultimate blessing of Shalom, are to reign, is evidently defined geographically and inclusively.

This carries implications for personal almsgivings within our local areas around our synagogues (for example, by supporting soup kitchens and food banks locally), and also obviously for welfare provision organised by Jewish communities and by the Jewish state, which should be careful to treat all its citizens equally.

EXIGENCY CARRIES ITS OWN PRIORITY.

Third, the ordo amoris is defeasible in the presence of overwhelming need; that is to say the priority to be given to family, friends and community can be understood to apply in cases of equal need and to be trumped by greater need.

In the Yom Kippur leaflet for JEP this year, Daniel Greenberg quoted “the Tzadik Reb Aryeh Levin who on learning that there was a famine in Africa initiated a collection to help relieve it: when asked whether one could contribute from ma’aser money (tithes) his response was firm: “No, you cannot – so give me some money that is not from ma’aser”.

Reb Aryeh’s response might have been ad hominem: it may be that the questioner could obviously afford to give his tithe to communal charities and then to add further donations for the benefit of those suffering famine in Africa; so there was no need for the latter cause to compromise the former. Or it could be that there is a sort of lexical priority to be given to the inner circle of obligation, so that all pressing needs must be addressed before giving beyond that circle? Even on that interpretation, it seems likely that there is some level of distant need which would indeed trump minor claims on our on charitable funds even from the inner circle. What would have been Reb Aryeh’s response to someone who really couldn’t afford more than their ma’aser contribution?

SOCIAL JUSTICE.

Fourth, there are domains of resource allocation, broadly understood, where prioritisation of those close to us is inappropriate altogether. In particular, in the administration of justice we are admonished repeatedly not to respect position, rather to deal impartially.

And this applies equally when we come to issues of social justice, administered by communal institutions and those of the Jewish government. In such matters, which embrace the organisation of the national and international economy, property rights and communal resources are to be allocated to optimise welfare and to address relative need.

This at any rate is how the Meiri interprets the discussion in the Talmud identifying the dual nature of justice:  justice in disputes regarding existing property rights, and justice in other domains, which can be characterised as social justice:

יש דברים שאין מדת הדין שולטת בהם ואתה צריך לחזר בהם אחר מה שראוי יותר ולהכריע את האחד למה שאין מדת הדין מחייבתו דרך פשרא ומדה מעולה והוא שאמרו כתוב אחד אומר "[לֹא-תַעֲשׂוּ עָוֶל בַּמִּשְׁפָּט לֹא-תִשָּׂא פְנֵי-דָל וְלֹא תֶהְדַּר פְּנֵי גָדוֹל] בְּצֶדֶק תִּשְׁפֹּט עֲמִיתֶךָ" [ויקרא י"ט ט"ו

וכתוב אחד אומר " צֶ֥דֶק צֶ֖דֶק תִּרְדֹּ֑ף [לְמַ֤עַן תִּֽחְיֶה֙ וְיָרַשְׁתָּ֣ אֶת־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־ה" אֱלֹק֖יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָֽךְ׃" דברים ט"ז כ.] כאן לדין כאן לפשרא

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף״ – אֶחָד לְדִין וְאֶחָד לִפְשָׁרָה. כֵּיצַד? שְׁתֵּי סְפִינוֹת עוֹבְרוֹת בַּנָּהָר וּפָגְעוּ זֶה בָּזֶה, אִם עוֹבְרוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן – שְׁתֵּיהֶן טוֹבְעוֹת, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹבְרוֹת. וְכֵן שְׁנֵי גְּמַלִּים שֶׁהָיוּ עוֹלִים בְּמַעֲלוֹת בֵּית חוֹרוֹן וּפָגְעוּ זֶה בָּזֶה, אִם עָלוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן – שְׁנֵיהֶן נוֹפְלִין, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – שְׁנֵיהֶן עוֹלִין

הָא כֵּיצַד? טְעוּנָה וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה – תִּידָּחֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה מִפְּנֵי טְעוּנָה. קְרוֹבָה וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ קְרוֹבָה – תִּידָּחֶה קְרוֹבָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינָהּ קְרוֹבָה. הָיוּ שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְרוֹבוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן רְחוֹקוֹת – הָטֵל פְּשָׁרָה בֵּינֵיהֶן, וּמֵעֲלוֹת שָׂכָר זוֹ לָזוֹ. [סנהדרין ל״ב:] וכן כל כיוצא בה כל שאנו רואים שיכול לסבול העכוב ביותר ידחה מפני חברו וכן בריא מפני חולה וכל כיוצא בזה אף לענין הדין אמרו שאם היו לפני הדיין הרבה בעלי דינין מקדימין יתום לאלמנה ואלמנה לתלמיד חכם ותלמיד חכם לעם הארץ ואשה קודמת לאיש מפני שבשתה מרובה ואם הכל שוה מקדימין לקודם

מאירי לסנהדרין ל"ב

There are matters regarding which the attribute of strict legality is not applicable and one is required to seek after what [allocation of rights or resources] is most appropriate and to determine [the matter] against one who is not otherwise obligated in the manner of compromise [with existing property rights, invoking] an elevated attribute. This is as the Rabbis said: [Sanhedrin 32b] it is written in one verse: “[You shall not commit a perversion of justice; you shall not favour the poor and you shall not honour the great;] in justice shall you judge your neighbour” (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: “Justice, justice, shall you follow [in order that you shall live and that you shall inherit the land that the Lord your God gives to you]” (Deuteronomy 16:20).  How can these texts be reconciled? As it is taught in a baraita: one mention of “justice” is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats travelling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, [as the river is not wide enough for both to pass]. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit Ḥoron, [where there is a narrow steep path], and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend. How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, [i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred] [End Of Quotation from Sanhedrin 32b.] and so it is with all similar cases [comments the Meiri]: we see who is most able to bear the burden and we relegate that person’s claim relative to his fellow, and so a healthy person is displaced by a sick person, and similarly in similar comparisons. Even in the matter of judgement itself, if there are before a court many litigants seeking justice, precedence is given [to hearing the case of] the orphan over the widow, and to the widow over the scholar, and to the scholar over the peasant, and a woman takes precedence over a man because her embarrassment is greater, and only if everything is equal do we apply first come first served.

Meiri to Sanhedrin 32b.

The generality of what the Meiri sees in this Talmudic discussion is striking, but it is also well anchored in the text. The source verses speak of justice in general, pointing to a second dimension, beyond that normally meted out in a courtroom. And the examples given by the Talmud refer to trade relations, the relations that underpin all economic activity. It is not obvious that there is any need for the state or the justice system to get involved in allocation of rights in these contexts at all: a minimal state would just leave it to the trading parties to work something out for themselves. But the Talmud is clearly concerned not to allow market power to determine the outcome.

Instead, we are given two measures of need, which on reflection are quite general in application. First, the extent of the suffering imposed from losing out in the particular context: exemplified here by the additional costs of a day’s delay for a ship or a camel that is laden and thus exposed to additional risk or insurance costs. A parallel might be in the allocation of health resources, priority for, say, hip replacement should be given to someone whose current pain or immobility is the greater. Second, the economic and welfare position of the potential beneficiaries, with priority to be given to the one who is further removed from repose, illustrated by the distance from harbour. In the health parallel, that would mean priority to somebody who is more disadvantaged in other aspects of their life. These two metrics of need have very wide application in determining social policy, for instance in education (favouring those who have most to gain from education, and also those who are multiply disadvantaged), or in tax structures (taxing those whose behaviour will be least distorted by the tax, and taxing the rich), or in transport policy etc etc

But what is also striking is that there is no suggestion, neither in the Talmud nor in the commentary, of any precedence to be given to friends or neighbours. On the contrary, this is designated as justice, in this case social justice, where the intrusion of personal relations is strictly forbidden.

The extent of the obligations of social justice are thus seen to be vast, and immune from the prioritisation of the ordo amoris.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Fifth, there is evidently another order of priority and compassion which is enjoined upon us collectively: he Jewish community as a whole is to be a light and a blessing to the nations. (Isaiah 49.6; Genesis 22:18).  

Paradigmatically, this is expressed, during Succoth, by bringing offerings on behalf of the other nations, which Rashi explains is to secure for them the blessing of rain (which is ordained at this season) and protection from affliction. (See Succah 55b, and Rashi there and on Numbers 29:13.)

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הָנֵי שִׁבְעִים פָּרִים כְּנֶגֶד מִי — כְּנֶגֶד שִׁבְעִים אוּמּוֹת. פַּר יְחִידִי לָמָּה — כְּנֶגֶד אוּמָּה יְחִידָה

סוכה נה

Rabbi Elazar said: These seventy bulls that are sacrificed as additional offerings over the course of the seven days of Sukkot, to what do they correspond? They correspond to the seventy nations of the world.

Babylonian Talmud, Succah 55b

So, whereas individuals prioritise families and their communities in order to create and sustain the family and the community itself, the community as a whole, Israel as a nation, is obligated to show compassion and charity and concern towards other nations.

How do we do this in the absence of the temple?

The object of our endeavours can be to mimic the effect of the offerings that are no longer brought on behalf of the nations, by providing aid to combat drought and famine, and through diplomatic and political support for agencies and parties working for liberation from dictatorship and other forms of affliction.

If this is a collective responsibility, it should be done on behalf of the Jewish people collectively. Obviously, there is a role here for the State of Israel, a role which it has discharged particularly in times natural disaster. Its aid budget however has shrunk over recent decades (see riseandfall.pdf).

For individual jews, collective responsibility towards other communities requires us to advocate through democratic voice and campaigning that the Jewish government plays its full role in alleviating global suffering. A further mechanism including for Jews in the diaspora is for individuals to contribute to communal institutions that provide foreign aid on behalf of the Jewish people, such as World Jewish Relief.

Supporting communal institutions to take responsibility for providing succour to those in need elsewhere, is of course also to strengthen those communal institutions and to create a shared sense of purpose, so also building our own community by dedicating it for the good of all. Whether such contributions should count towards ma’aser is therefore open to debate, but their necessity is not!

In sum, from a Jewish perspective, showing special concern in various ways for those who are closest to us through ties of family, of community and of religion is indeed appropriate. But the concept of local community embraces Jews and non-Jews alike; and there is also a minimum demand of compassion towards all, one that is sensitive to the acuity of need. Furthermore, we have seen that the obligations of social justice operate in a different domain altogether, one that differentiates on grounds of need but not otherwise. Finally, the Jewish nation should collectively embrace its aspiration to be a blessing to other nations through material as well as spiritual means. Our national and communal obligations to other communities and individuals in need, and those falling on us individually and locally, transcend and put into context the modest place in our ethics of the ordo amoris.

Elul 5785