"Purity of Arms": A Religious-Zionist Perspective
By Israel Rozenson.
Translated by Claude edited by Donald Franklin for The Jewish Ethics Project, with permission.
Originally published as טוהר הנשק: מבט ציוני־דתי in De'ot (דעות), Issue 111, by the Ne'emanei Torah Va'Avodah movement.
"Even the profane talk of Torah scholars requires study," says the Gemara in Tractate Avodah Zarah (19b); all the more so when the "profane talk" in question is not so mundane, and the "Torah scholars" involved stand at the very pinnacle of their teaching authority.
What am I referring to? Ostensibly, a source that is inconsequential historically, let alone halakhically. In the summer of 1948, the journal HaTzofeh, founded by the World Mizrachi Movement (edited by Rabbi Meir Berlin), reported a speech given by Rav Shaul Yisraeli, zts’l, Rav of Kfar HaRo'eh, at an IDF swearing-in ceremony at a training base in the Hefer Valley. In his speech, Rav Yisraeli called on the soldiers "to maintain purity of character, the morality of Israel, and purity of arms [tohar haneshek]. He said the soldiers were opening a new page in the liberated land, and blessed are those who on this day join the lineage of the first commander, Joshua son of Nun, and the last, Rabbi Akiva son of Yosef, both of whom displayed immense spiritual strength." [1]
This report, which in my best assessment accurately summarized the speech, is not a minor matter. It presents an important Rav in Israel who, in wartime, placed morality at the centre of his concerns, highlighting within it "purity of arms." He drew on the legendary figures of the commander Joshua son of Nun and of Rabbi Akiva to exemplify the courage and sacrifice required on the battlefield.
In my view, Rav Yisraeli clearly saw no contradiction between purity of arms and Joshua's war. In the educational establishment of that time and even afterward, there were some who regarded the two as contradictory. I can only suggest that from an interpretive standpoint, one can understand the Book of Joshua as teaching that eliminative warfare is permitted only by direct divine command. If this basic principle is accepted, it follows that there is an obligation toward maximal restraint and self-control in cases lacking direct heavenly instruction — and restraint and self-control are indeed deeply embedded in the concept of "purity of arms" and its spirit. This is not the place to elaborate; I merely wished to show how the issue appears from Rav Yisraeli's vantage point.
Engagement with the Morality of War
Rav Yisraeli's engagement with the ethics of warfare in light of the Sources emerges not only from the incidental report cited above. Already during the War of Independence, the halakhic forum HaTorah VeHaMedinah, which he edited, began to be published; bringing the study of military law to the attention of the Torah world in those early, formative years. First and foremost, the basis for discussing "obligatory war" was established [2], and various laws relating to military life were constructed [3].
Not every issue that needed to be addressed arising within the ranks of the Haganah under the principle of "purity of arms" was clearly addressed in these initial articles. Nor were all the specific problems arising from the moral treatment of the enemy — which arose again and again in the field, i.e., on the battlefield during the "Events" (1936–1939) and the War of Independence — known to the rabbis.
Nevertheless, several important determinations on moral issues did appear in the articles of HaTorah VeHaMedinah — for example, on matters of looting enemy spoils, which was without doubt a widespread problem during the War of Independence, and on the question of leaving an "open side" (an unbesieged flank) when laying siege to an enemy settlement, so as to allow escape. These issues were handled using the long-established methods of decision-making in the scholarly world. Although the concept of "purity of arms," representing the values of the Zionist security establishment, was not explicitly formulated, it stood in the background.
Rav Yisraeli's own articles in the issues of HaTorah VeHaMedinah that he edited did not at that time deal with specific military issues, but matters of military morality were not slow to appear publicly in his teaching. His clearest statement on the matter concerned the retaliatory operation at Qibya, which took place on the night of October 14–15, 1953. In a seminal article on the Qibya incident, [4] the Rav wrote in standard halakhic language that did not directly reference purity of arms. Moreover, in the opening section the Rav even distanced himself from the morality of the nations in these contexts: "It is not from their mouths that we live, nor from them that we learn honesty and justice. However, we are obligated to clarify the manner of our response according to the Torah, whose ‘ways are ways of pleasantness and all of whose paths are peace.’"[5] We can only assess that in emphasising that we should "clarify the manner of our response according to the Torah," there is an element of reservation about giving weight to external moral considerations — even ones that arose from within our own society, such as "purity of arms."
We cannot summarize here the rabbi's extensive article, "Military Operations for the Defence of the State" [6]; suffice it to say that regarding harm to those now termed " uninvolved," the theme of placing responsibility on the enemy is prominent in his teaching — not, heaven forbid, out of disregard for the life of the individual Arab; on the contrary, his words are written out of a basic, universal valuation of humankind. He expects a parallel moral framework from the opposing side, one that demands responsibility and moral accountability for their own people.
And yet, when it comes to the killing of children during military activity, special sensitivity is called for: "Indeed, as a matter of policy intentionally to harm children— such a thing we find only in amongst idolatrous perversity. Therefore, it is proper to ensure that one does not harm them. And may the good Lord look upon the affliction of His people, and bind up their adversaries and root them out from the land of the living." [7]
This does not appear to be mere piety; it flows from a deep concern about what war can do to a fighter — a brutalization that reaches the loss of one's humanity. This concern gives rise to a prayer that the problem that led to war will be solved some other way.
In reality at the time, most fighters who upheld "purity of arms" were not in the habit of praying, but it seems that despite its distinctly religious language, the spirit of "purity of arms" is embedded in this period, calling for restraint and self-control regarding all bloodshed.
The Origin of the Concept of Purity of Arms
The phrase "purity of arms" is thought to have originated with Berl Katznelson, one of the prominent leaders of the Labour movement, in a speech he gave at the 21st Zionist Congress in the second half of August 1939: "Restraint [havlagah] means: let our weaponry be pure. We learn, we bear arms, we stand against those who rise against us, but we do not want our weaponry to be stained with innocent blood." Looking back, it is hard not to be moved by the fact that "seconds" before the outbreak of the deadliest of wars — just before the darkness of evil descended upon the world — the Jewish people, in her special assembly, sat and discussed "purity of arms," binding herself in advance with moral restraints even as she fought for her life.
The phrase "purity of arms" soon became a slogan, a moral banner, and a beacon across all the security branches of the organized Yishuv and the Labour movement — the Haganah and the Palmach. It is hard to say that it was adopted in a similar way in Revisionist circles; the young Irgun took a different path and did not impose moral restrictions of this kind on its retaliatory actions against Arabs.
The concept emerged as the "Events" [Arab Revolt] were winding down, but it reflected the moral codes that guided the Yishuv regarding Arab aggression during the Mandate period — the policy of restraint (havlagah), which was based on recognizing the presence of innocents among the enemy. Preventing harm to innocents (which over time became "efforts to prevent," "minimizing harm," and other formulations dictated by reality) was what stood before the eyes of those who shaped the restraint policy.
Albeit this policy also had various political benefits, but its moral foundation was strong and firm. What were the sources of "purity of arms"? While working on this article, I heard many people attribute it to "Western morality," "Christian morality," "progressivism," and the like. Not at all! In scholarship there is a known claim that the foundations of "purity of arms" lie in a tradition of conduct of respect, chivalry, and nobility that characterized revolutionaries especially in the Russian cultural sphere, which called for avoiding harm to innocents. This should not be denied, but what seems to me beyond any doubt is that efforts to locate "purity of arms" within the branching system of Jewish sources have never ceased.
At this point I come to Religious Zionism. One can say that during the period of restraint, there existed a significant ideological partnership between Religious Zionism, under central rabbinic leadership, and circles for whom "purity of arms" was a slogan and a value. I will make do here with a brief account of the great protest in the summer of 1939 against the killing of uninvolved Arabs in response to the murder of Jews. The Irgun stood behind most of these attacks at the time; and on public platforms, at various gatherings, in articles and in leaflets, a feverish protest campaign took place, characterized by the slogan "Thou shalt not murder." Those making the declarations did not always enter into detailed halakhic analysis, but the impression conveyed was entirely clear: "Thou shalt not murder" applies to an innocent Arab as well.
Publicly, this clarified the basic connection between the "purity of arms" yoke of that era and the ancient "Thou shalt not murder" of the Ten Commandments. It was not simple to include the Arab enemy within the scope of "Thou shalt not murder," but this is how it was understood. And it is important to note, I use the category "innocent" not as characterization within some comprehensive moral analysis, but because this was the common term; this exact expression was used when "purity of arms" was discussed.
Such an understanding was accepted by Religious Zionism at the time, and even when, during the War of Independence, efforts began to establish an orderly doctrine of the laws of war, the meaning of "purity of arms," embodying the concern over "Thou shalt not murder," was not abandoned. Rav Yisraeli, who engaged in analytical examination of the halakhic insights on the matter, did not hesitate to use this phrase publicly. Even in the absence of potential for halakhic development, he correctly understood the spiritual meaning embedded within it.
Reckoning Our Moral World
The most impressive expression, in my view, of this spirit of "purity of arms" within the Religious-Zionist sphere appears in a passage published in HaTzofeh about a decade after the war, when the verdicts against those who killed Arabs in Kafr Qasim (October 29, 1956) were published. In the news-analysis section of the paper, in an unsigned article (apparently by the editor Shabtai Don-Yihya, also known by the pen name S. Daniel), the shooting of residents of the village returning home during curfew was described as "staining" the "purity of arms": "Murder with no necessity whatsoever, murder of the sort 'better that a few of them go this way,' stains the purity of arms and defiles the defenders [i.e., the IDF]." [8]
Blending halakhic and moral terms, it stated: "Great moral significance attaches to this ruling of the court [i.e., of the state], which is based on the Jewish moral principle that 'there is no agency for a transgression,' meaning the agent cannot place the blame on the one who sent him, given that 'when the words of the master and the words of the disciple conflict, whose words are heeded?' In the clash between absolute justice and a commander's order — justice prevails, and ‘justice’ here meant refraining from murdering civilians — including Arabs! — who had committed no sin."
The central argument continued to be woven with threads of religious and general morality:
"Even though formally we can all say 'our hands did not shed this blood,' since it [the verdict] causes pain, it also compels us to take stock of our moral world. Our father Jacob, when going to meet his brother Esau, found himself in distress. 'And Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed' — Rashi explains, in the name of the Sages: 'He feared lest he be killed, and was distressed lest he kill others.'"
And from this a pedagogical conclusion follows for the IDF: "The Israel Defence Forces, whose strength lies in the moral values embedded within it, will need to devote much thought to how the soldier is trained to distinguish between law and its violation regarding obedience."
Anyone who imagines that the difficult security situation accompanying the state since its birth will lead to concessions and compromises will discover that, according to HaTzofeh, that is not the way. The right path involves rising above: "This is the distress of a people, constrained, fighting its enemies with its remaining strength, while at the same time holding the sanctity of human life — every human life [including Arabs] — at the head of its religious-moral values."
The conclusion drawn from everything that happened at Kafr Qasim is to give the young generation a moral education based on a moral synthesis: shaping "a tough and brave generation that risks its life to save Jews and preserve our national existence, while at the same time knowing how to distinguish rigorously between one Arab person and another, between one circumstance and another, and not to shed blood unless absolutely necessary." And the educational path is clear: "There is a need for constant moral vigilance in order to be saved from failure … and there is a need for a morally rigorous education in order to balance the scales between 'rise up and kill him first' and 'thou shalt not murder.'"
The matter reaches its climax in sentences such as: "[One must act] to preserve our image, the image of God in man, so that it will shine even in times of emergency," whilst being greatly fearful of the slide: "How shall we preserve this house — a house for a people of 'thou shalt not murder' — against moral collapse?"
It would be hard to find elsewhere statements so emphatic, so grounded in aggadic sources, in interpretation, and also in halakha, expressing the spirit of "purity of arms" that grew within the secular Labour movement — statements teaching about its status as a marker of constant concern to avoid sliding infraction of “thou shalt not kill” those created in God's image, Arabs — and this addressed to the readers of HaTzofeh, then the organ of the National Religious Party (Mafdal), namely the people of Religious Zionism.
Misplaced Mockery
The years passed, and among those who bore arms the phrase "purity of arms" gradually took on complexity. As a component of the IDF's ethical code, expressing the "Spirit of the IDF," it generally remained in place, dictating the proper moral path for our military. In Religious Zionism too, some continued to find in it a source of pride, a sign of the moral distinctiveness and moral originality of our army, caught up in endless wars. The concept continued to arouse interest and was widely discussed, not infrequently critically — criticism that, over time, reached the point of devaluing it, of mockery, especially regarding the pretension of an army that inscribes on its banner the title "the most moral army in the world."
It seems that within the Religious-Zionist community, a fundamental ambivalence remains about how to relate to a banner that undoubtedly distinguishes the Jewish people — attested to by the difficulty of translating the concept of tohar haneshek into foreign languages [notwithstanding its traditional translation as “purity of arms”] — yet one that does not derive directly from Torah sources. Its association with the secular-liberal facet of Zionist culture and its legalisms have challenged Religious-Zionist thinkers as well as military rabbis to grapple with incorporating it into halakhic rulings on military matters.[9] On the other hand, substantive criticism has arisen regarding the moral path that "purity of arms" charts, which critics link to Western morality rooted in Christian thought.[10] At the same time, a significant stream has developed that has rejected it altogether, and within that stream too the concept of "purity of arms" has been mocked — from the opposite direction.
After October 7th, Rabbi Chaim Navon wrote in Makor Rishon: "The horrors of Simchat Torah have brought about, at least for now, a shaking-off of layers of quasi-humanistic self-beautification that had accumulated in the IDF and in the Israeli public. Enough with strange procedures like 'knock on the roof,' which invite terrorists to flee before they are bombed." [11] And further on: "And if the terrorists use their own brothers as a human shield, they, as noted, are responsible for their safety — not us." One can debate his claims on their merits, and he certainly has halakhic support. But is "purity of arms," characterized here as "quasi-humanistic self-beautification," deserving of such dismissal? Is "knock on the roof" a "strange procedure"? Perhaps at certain moments one may choose a path that disregards this guideline, but do we really want that deep concern over "thou shalt not murder," which accompanies military activity of any kind, to dissipate entirely?
A further expression of the shift in attitude toward the concept appears in the words of Rabbi Moshe Gantz, who wrote in Adar 5770 (2010): "Here is the place to present a serious halakhic issue [...] I refer to the matter known as 'purity of arms.' This matter determines the IDF's methods of warfare in a way that may lead to soldiers' deaths! There is no doubt that according to Torah law, giving up the 'neighbour procedure,' [employing enemy civilians to mitigate risks to our soldiers] when it may cost human life, is a great crime. Even though the High Court of Justice considers it a great mitzvah [...] even though rabbis express their opinion on every occasion against 'purity of arms' in its current form, religious soldiers accept — albeit reluctantly — what is customary in the army." [12] [13]
Ostensibly, these matters are open to debate. One can also argue about the "neighbour procedure," since the term "purity of arms" is not hermetically sealed, and invites debate. Since it first rose to the platform of Jewish morality, the methods of warfare have changed so much, and naturally this has brought about changes in the moral response as well. The concept of "purity of arms" invites reflection, and its great importance lies in its being a restraining, educational factor. But when it is positioned as forcing on the religious soldier a choice to align with the High Court of Justice — as a kind of "contest" with the moral authority of the commandments of Moses our teacher versus the rulings of the High Court — "purity of arms" will be forced to yield its place.
What are the implications of all this? Will we see, in the future, a central rabbinic figure standing before IDF soldiers to speak in praise of "purity of arms," as in the example that opened this article? My personal opinion, wrapped in great anxiety for the future, can of course be guessed from what has been written here, and beyond that I leave the discussion to those greater than I.
Notes:
[1] "The Soldiers Shall Keep the Morality of Israel and the Purity of Arms," HaTzofeh (June 29, 1948).
[2] Rabbi K.P. Tchursh, "War of Permission, Commandment, or Obligation," HaTorah VeHaMedinah, vol. 2 (Iyar 5710), pp. 89–98; Rabbi Ephraim Weinberg, "On the Above," ibid., pp. 99–102.
[3] Rabbi K.P. Tchursh, "Prohibition and Permission in the Army at War," HaTorah VeHaMedinah, vol. 1 (Nisan 5709), pp. 79–88; Rabbi M.Y. Ospizai, "Laws of War Spoils," ibid., pp. 89–95; Rabbi Ch.Y. Lifschkin, "Problems in Wartime Conquest," ibid., pp. 94–95.
[4] In Dror Greenblum's phrasing: "In Rav Yisraeli's foundational article on the Qibya incident" (Dror Greenblum, From Heroism of the Spirit to the Sanctification of Power — Between 1948 and 1967, PhD dissertation, Haifa 2009, p. 127).
[5] Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, Amud HaYemani, Tel Aviv 5726, Siman 16, p. 162.
[6] Ibid., pp. 162–199.
[7] Ibid., p. 199.
[8] "The Verdict," HaTzofeh (October 17, 1958).
[9] See, for example, the discussion by Rabbi Prof. Neriah Gutel on the status of international law in halakhic discourse, "Fighting in an Area Saturated with Civilian Population," Techumin, 23 (5763), p. 18; Ido Rechnitz and Elazar Goldstein, Jewish Military Ethics, Tel Aviv 2013, pp. 102–103, which give examples of judicious use of weapons in the IDF.
[10] Elad Lisson, "In Their Death They Commanded Us Legitimacy," HaShiloach, 24 (Nisan 5781).
[11] Rabbi Chaim Navon, "The Excessive Soul-Searching Around 'Purity of Arms' Has Become Irrelevant," Makor Rishon, January 13, 2024.
[12] Rabbi Moshe Gantz, "On Unity in the Army," Rak Chazak VeEmatz — A Torah Forum on Issues of Loyalty in the Army, 1 (Adar 5770).
[13] On 6 October 2005, the Supreme Court of Israel issued a final verdict ruling that the Israeli army's use of Palestinian civilians in military operations constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law. Adalah: Press Release
“Can I really claim to be part of the symbolic flock of sheep that is passing through the gap under the severe and unblinking scrutiny of the Lord of all creation today?”
